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ABSTRACT:  This study presents a field experiment in which media articles for a random sample of firms 
with earnings announcements are promoted to a one percent subset of Yahoo Finance users. Promoted firms 
have higher abnormal returns and some evidence of lower bid-ask spreads on the day of the earnings 
announcement. These results are more pronounced for less visible firms, negative earnings news, and on 
days with fewer promoted firms. These findings suggest that investor attention affects the pricing of 
earnings and that retail investors buy stocks that catch their attention, in a setting where attention is 
randomly assigned. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on investor attention and the effects of media in financial markets generally 
rely on observational studies to investigate the links between media and investor activities. We 
conduct a field experiment where randomly selected earnings announcements are promoted to 
users of Yahoo Finance, and observe the aggregate market response, in an attempt to provide 
evidence of the effects of investor attention at earnings announcements.1 Our results in theory can 
be considered causal, as the treatment is randomly assigned, and both help to confirm prior studies 
that find effects of media attention on individual investors or individual stocks, and extend the 
literature on aggregate market effects of investor attention and the media. We build upon prior 
observational studies that generally use proxies such as media attention, extreme returns, trading 
volume, investor composition, and the salience of earnings announcements to study the effects of 
investor attention on financial markets (e.g., Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002; Barber and Odean 2008; 
Lehavy and Sloan 2008; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009; Aboody, 
Lehavy, and Trueman 2010; Engelberg and Parsons 2011).  
Media has been shown to be associated with financial markets and other economic activity 
(e.g., Tetlock 2007; Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 2008; 
Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura 2014; Kaniel and Parham 2017). Firms can also manage the media 
to influence stock prices (e.g., Ahern and Sosyura 2014). The role of the media in price formation 
occurs through the dissemination of new information to market participants, and it may also occur 
by increasing investor attention; for example, by promoting stale information that should not 
otherwise have an effect on prices. In observational studies, it is inherently difficult to disentangle 
                                                 
1 Our experiment occurs in the environment where subjects are naturally undertaking their usual tasks, as opposed to in a laboratory, 
and the conditions in which they operate are subject to randomized treatment without the subjects’ awareness of the treatment. 
Floyd and List (2016) use the term “natural field experiment” to describe this setting, and they discuss the complete spectrum of 
experimental techniques used in the accounting and finance literatures. 
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the effects of investor attention from market-based and media-based measures, because these 
measures both reflect and generate investor attention.  
It is clear that the media cannot promote all news with equal emphasis.2 Instead, consumers 
of news prefer their media providers to help them filter news to focus on the most important items 
(e.g., Hamilton 2004; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010). Thus, editorial choices determine which 
information is made more salient, either through a more prominent position such as on the front 
page of the Wall Street Journal, or through more channels, as in the decision by local media outlets 
to cover a story (Engelberg and Parsons 2011). Consequently, studies that use media measures as 
a proxy for investor attention need to diligently control for the information content of the news 
itself, because media coverage is by definition responding to events and the information content 
of those events, as well as to the demand of media consumers, which can endogenously determine 
the selection and prominence of disseminated information. 
Prior literature examining the effects of media and investor attention at earnings 
announcements suggests that media does affect market participants’ responses to earnings 
announcements. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) study retail brokerage accounts and show that local 
media coverage of earnings announcements appears to spur local retail trading volume, though 
their setting does not examine the market-wide effects of media on returns or volumes. Drake, 
Guest, and Twedt (2014) find that media coverage appears to mitigate cash flow mispricing but 
not accrual mispricing. Related research examines the effects of investor attention on earnings 
announcement responses, without specifically considering the media. DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) suggest that inattention to Friday earnings announcements versus those on other weekdays 
                                                 
2 Even if the New York Times could literally publish “All the News That’s Fit to Print”, it still makes editorial decisions about 
which are the most important articles to print on the front page, or towards the front of each section.  
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is related to a lower immediate response to earnings announcements coupled with a greater delayed 
response. Consistent with DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015) 
and Lawrence, Ryans, Sun, and Laptev (2017a) provide evidence that responses to earnings are 
associated with increased investor attention. However, in these observational settings, it is difficult 
to draw causal inferences between the investor attention measures and the observed market 
response, because the underlying properties of the news will likely affect both the market response 
and the investor attention measures. 
Barber and Odean (2008) infer that individual investors reduce the complexity of their 
portfolio decisions by trading based on salience, proxied by firms that are in the news, that have 
unusual trading volume, and that recently experienced extreme returns. Since individual investors 
have small portfolios, they are neither likely to already own any particular stock, which they would 
then be able to sell, nor are they likely to take short positions. Observing greater buy-sell 
imbalances by individual investors on high-attention days leads them to conclude that retail 
investors are net buyers of firms that grab attention. Huberman and Regev (2001) is closely related 
to our study in that it attempts to show the effects of an exogenous shock to investor attention. 
Their case study on EntreMed, a firm promoted in a front-page article in the New York Times, 
shows a significant and sustained stock price increase following this coverage, even though the 
substantive information in the New York Times article was published in the scientific literature 
several months prior. Tetlock (2011) finds that individual investors trade on stale news, when new 
articles are published even when these new articles are textually similar to prior articles. In these 
settings it is difficult to control for other information that may have entered into the editorial 
decision to report on apparently stale news or to publish such an article on the front page of the 
New York Times. Hence, there remains the possibility that such publication decisions reflect 
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unobserved additional information and confer additional reputational benefits on the firm despite 
the stale nature of the news. Additionally, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) study the Google Trends 
search index to identify positive returns to investor attention and reversals of these positive returns 
in subsequent periods. 
We extend this literature by examining whether random increases in investor attention, 
through promotion of firm-specific earnings announcement news on the front page of Yahoo 
Finance, result in increases in abnormal returns and volumes, decreases in bid-ask spreads as well 
as increases in the information acquisition of financial data by users subject to the promotion. In 
this way, we ensure that there is no other underlying information that entered into the publication 
or promotional decision, instead selecting firms and their articles at random for promotion to 
Yahoo Finance users. Given that the majority of firm-days have zero media coverage (e.g., 
Lawrence, Ryans, and Sun 2017b), we use the earnings announcement setting because our 
experimental design requires that a firm has at least one timely news article available to be shown 
to our sample of users. Our decision to focus on earnings announcements provides a setting where 
even if all of the major publications do not produce an article on an earnings announcement, a 
robot-generated article summarizing the earnings announcement such as one from the Associated 
Press (e.g., Blankespoor, deHaan, and Zhu 2017) should be available for Yahoo Finance to 
promote.  
Yahoo Finance is the most popular financial web site in the U.S. with over 78 million 
unique monthly visits (CNBC 2016), an audience that is more than 3 times that of the web sites 
belonging to The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg News, each with approximately 20 million 
unique monthly visits (Bloomberg 2015). The field experiment was run on Yahoo Finance from 
May 12 to July 28, 2016, to an audience comprised of a one percent sample of Yahoo Finance 
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users, which would equate to roughly The Wall Street Journal’s entire web-traffic for 
Massachusetts including Boston. The one percent sample was calibrated by Yahoo Finance such 
that the target users and their activities were representative of the Yahoo Finance user population. 
Thus, news articles on a random sample of earnings announcements were promoted to a significant 
audience in an attempt to separate the effects of the media promotion from the various factors that 
cause both media promotion and investor attention. In turn, any resulting effects should only be 
due to the additional investor attention generated from viewing an existing article, and unrelated 
to any editorial decision to write or promote a particular article or company. Given the restricted 
sample size of the experiment, our power to detect an effect of promotion is much higher for returns 
and bid-ask spread and is much lower for volume and information acquisition.  
Every day during the experiment period, the lesser of five or 50 percent of companies with 
earnings announcements on that day were randomly selected for promotion and paired with an 
equal number of size matched control firms who also report earnings on that day. For example, if 
there were six firms reporting earnings on a given day, three would be randomly selected as 
treatment firms and the remaining three firms would be designated as control firms. If more than 
ten stocks announce earnings on a day, we randomly select five for treatment and choose the five 
control firms with the closest market capitalizations to the treatment firms, without replacement. 
Treatment stocks were promoted for 24 hours, during which time the most recently available news 
articles relating to the treatment stocks were posted at the top of the article list on the Yahoo 
Finance home page for the experiment user sample. Section 2 provides more specific details 
concerning the experimental design.  
We find that promoted firms have similar fundamental and earnings-news characteristics 
as the control firms, indicating that the covariates are balanced across the two groups. We 
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document that promoted firms have a significant increase in abnormal returns on the day of the 
earnings announcement (i.e., the news promotion day) of approximately 160 basis points relative 
to control firms. These findings are more pronounced for smaller and thus less visible firms, for 
firms that missed analysts’ earnings expectations, and on days when fewer firms were promoted. 
Our analysis confirms that outliers are not responsible for our return findings as there is a clear 
shift in the distribution of abnormal returns for treatment firms, suggesting that the media 
promotion resulted in some of the experiment users purchasing these stocks on the day the stock 
was promoted. Abnormal bid-ask spreads were lower for promoted firms, but with marginal 
statistical significance, indicating the potential for a reduction of information asymmetry when 
earnings news is more widely disseminated.  
We did not find corresponding increases in trading volume or information acquisition 
activities on Yahoo Finance by the users subject to the promotion, which is likely a result of the 
sample size. Moreover, we do find some evidence indicating that the pricing of the earnings news 
is less pronounced for promoted firms than for control firms given the positive price pressure 
resulting from the promotion. Taken together, the findings suggest that retail investors buy stocks 
that catch their attention and such purchases can affect the pricing of earnings, in a setting where 
attention is randomly assigned. 
Our study makes the following main contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
provides a clean experimental setting confirming observational studies documenting the effects of 
the business press and attention on stock prices. Second, it highlights that the market response on 
the day of the earnings announcement appears to depend not only on the earnings news but also 
on the extent of investor attention. Third, the lack of information acquisition activities by Yahoo 
Finance users subject to the promotion suggests that media promotion may not increase 
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information acquisition by individual investors, and therefore it appears that attention-generated 
trading is less informed. Lastly, the study provides an important extension to the earnings 
announcements return premium literature (e.g., Frazzini and Lamont 2007, Barber, De George, 
Lehavy, and Trueman 2013, Johnson and So 2014, Savor and Wilson 2016), by providing evidence 
suggesting that investor attention may be one of the key underlying mechanisms driving earnings 
announcement premiums. 
A potential concern is whether individuals who were shown the promotion and 
consequently buy shares are worse off in that they may acquire a stock that they do not want and 
incur transactions costs. It is important to note that such individuals would have been equally likely 
to make other random purchases based on the normal algorithms used for selecting news articles 
on Yahoo Finance. Additionally, we carefully structured our experiment so that no positive or 
negative bias was introduced into the promotion decision that would systematically mislead users, 
and we obtained reviews for our study from Boston University’s Institutional Review Board, 
London Business School’s Ethics Committee, and the University of California at Berkeley’s Office 
for Protection of Human Subjects. Moreover, the SEC was receptive of our study and encouraged 
the pursuit of additional field studies of this nature, with suitable institutional review oversight. 
Overall, we hope that this study spurs more capital market field experiments in accounting and 
finance. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA 
In this study, we are primarily concerned with the effects of investor attention to media 
articles reporting on firms’ earnings announcements. From May 12 to July 28, 2016, Yahoo 
Finance promoted news articles for a randomly selected set of firms with earnings announcements 
occurring on each trading day, or which occurred after the market close on the previous trading 
 8 
day, to a one percent subsample of Yahoo Finance users. The one percent subsample was calibrated 
by Yahoo to be representative of the entire Yahoo Finance user population. The term “promoted” 
means that the most recent news items relating to the treatment stocks were placed among the top 
five positions in sample users’ home page news stream. Treated stocks were promoted for 24 
hours, after which time the next day’s treatment stocks were activated.  
Yahoo Finance allocated the top five positions on experiment users’ home pages for news 
article promotion over the course of this study. On days when five companies were selected for 
promotion and all had available articles, the most recent article for each firm is shown. For days 
when fewer than five firms were promoted, or when each firm did not have an available article, 
more than one article may be shown for each treatment firm with available articles. If fewer than 
five articles are available among all treatment firms, Yahoo Finance inserted other articles into the 
news feed based on default algorithms. Figure 1 illustrates a Yahoo Finance home page for a 
treatment sample user on May 18, 2016, and on this day, Hormel, Steris, and Booz Allen reported 
earnings and were randomly selected for promotion. Articles relating to these firms are visible 
among the five positions in the user’s news feed. Figure 2 includes the content of a Hormel article 
that was selected for promotion.  
Yahoo Finance is the most popular source of financial information in the U.S. (Lawrence, 
et al. 2017b), providing financial news as well as firm-specific financial and market-related 
information. When a user arrives at the Yahoo Finance home page (finance.yahoo.com), depicted 
in Figure 1, the main body section of the page is dedicated to news articles. In addition, users may 
search for firm specific financial information by entering a name or ticker symbol in the search 
field at the top of the page, or they may select a stock from their portfolio list or a list of recently 
viewed stocks, which are positioned along the right column. As Yahoo generates revenue from 
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display advertising (i.e., when impressions are delivered to users and when users click on an 
advertisement), news articles are strategically selected to maximize the number of times users click 
on the news articles during each visit to the web site.3  
In order to have a balanced panel of treatment and control firms, up to five earnings 
announcements were randomly selected from among those scheduled to be released each trading 
day, or after the close on the previous trading day. To schedule the promotion in Yahoo Finance’s 
systems, the random selection of stocks was generated each Tuesday from all firms expected to 
announce earnings during the subsequent week, for stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX exchanges and with confirmed earnings announcements on FactSet’s earnings calendar. 
Each treatment firm’s announcement date was manually validated by checking the company’s 
press releases or investor relations web site. Firms reporting earnings before and during market 
hours were scheduled for promotion on the report day, whereas firms reporting after hours were 
scheduled for promotion on the following trading day. To illustrate how the random selection 
process operated in practice, consider an example that fifteen companies were scheduled to report 
either on a given trading day or after the close on the previous trading day. Five firms would be 
randomly selected as treatment firms, and the remaining 10 firms would serve as the pool of control 
firms, to be size-matched one-to-one for our analysis. If only six firms were scheduled to report, 
three would be randomly selected as the treatment firms, and the remaining three would be 
designated as the control firms. Firms without scheduled earnings announcements do not appear 
in either our treatment or control samples.4 During the experiment period, 169 firms were sampled 
                                                 
3 Yahoo Inc. 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2015. Available at https://www.sec.gov. 
4 As we select firms for treatment after their earnings announcements are scheduled and verified, we are confident that our 
methodology balances the propensity, across treatment and control firms, to opportunistically alter the timing of the earnings 
announcements. Consistent with this notion, in untabulated analyses, we find the days between scheduled earnings announcements 
are indifferent across both treatment and control firms, and that the fraction of firms reporting bad news on busy days is indifferent 
from the faction of firms reporting bad news on non-busy days.  
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as treatment firms, and 1,134 firms were available control firms, with 169 being selected when 
size-matched to the closest treatment firm. Although we also document market effects using the 
complete unmatched pool of control firms, this method is less preferable as time-variant factors 
will not be equally balanced between the treatment and control firms, as in the one-to-one match 
approach.5  
Total page views is our measure of information acquisition by our sample Yahoo Finance 
users, and it comprises the normalized number of page views of our experiment users for all the 
firm-specific pages on the Yahoo Finance web site. Yahoo Finance records page views for each 
firm when a user views any of the firm-specific information pages. Views are generated from three 
main sources: (1) a user clicks on an active hyperlink to a firm’s stock ticker symbol, (2) a user 
types a firm’s name or ticker symbol into the Yahoo Finance search field, or (3) a user clicks 
through to a firm-specific information page from general search engine such as Google. Yahoo 
logs every firm-specific page view, and we sum all such firm specific page views on a given day 
for our experiment users. Because the level of Yahoo Finance page view traffic is provided on a 
confidential basis, we normalize the total page view count, dividing each firm-day count of page 
views by the average firm-day value over our sample period, giving our variable of interest, total 
page views, which has a mean value equal to one over all firm-days in our sample period. For our 
analysis, we then take the natural logarithm of one plus the normalized page views as log total 
page views, to be our measure of Yahoo Finance firm-specific information acquisition. We obtain 
our remaining financial and market data from FactSet, except for bid-ask spread, which is obtained 
from CRSP. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
                                                 
5 A greater number of firms report earnings towards the latter part of the sample period, and as a result there are a relatively even 
number of treatment firms throughout the experiment period, but a significantly larger number of control firms in the latter part. If 
the panel is not balanced, results relating to the control firms would be skewed towards the latter part of the experiment period. 
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Table 1 shows the extent to which the treatment and control firms are balanced on 
observable characteristics, including market capitalization, the number of analyst following, the 
number of media articles (media count), return on assets, market to book, earnings surprise, sales 
surprise, and the incidence of a management guidance update (guidance issuance). None of the 
control variables are significantly different at conventional levels between the treatment and 
control firms. To verify that there are no differences between the matched control sample and all 
available control firms, we also consider the entire available pool of control firms instead of the 
matched sample, and again find in unreported analyses that there is no statistical difference in the 
control variables of any of the mean and median values between treatment and control firms, 
indicating that the random selection is effective at balancing covariates.  
We perform regression analyses to control for the potential effects of residual differences 
between the two groups. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that are randomly 
selected for promotion on Yahoo Finance, and 0 for control firms. First, we perform a pooled 
regression analysis of our treatment and matched control firms on their earnings announcement 
day (t = 0).  
yit = α + β1 treatmentit + β2 treatmentit × earnings surpriseit + β controlsit + e it (1) 
Equation 1 presents the general regression equation where yit is one of the outcome 
variables of interest: total page views, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask 
spread for firm i on day t. These abnormal outcome measures follow Bushee, Core, Guay, and 
Hamm (2010) and Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014), and are used to observe differences 
between treatment and control firms. We use total page views and not abnormal page views (e.g., 
page views relative to the views on the same day of the week for the prior 10 weeks) for the 
treatment group because we are unable to obtain the search data for the treatment group prior to 
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the start of the experiment. There is one observation per firm (day t = 0, the earnings announcement 
day), and the primary coefficient of interest is β1, which indicates the marginal effect of treatment 
on the outcome variable. We include a number of control variables which may account for 
differences in the outcome variables: earnings surprise, log market capitalization, log media 
count, return on assets, market to book, and guidance issuance. For the returns regressions, we 
only include earnings surprise as a control variable, as it is the only variable expected to affect 
returns.6 We include industry fixed effects in all regressions to alleviate potential concerns that 
results are driven by industry differences between treatment and control firms. To understand 
whether the treatment effect varies based on the amount of the earnings surprise, we also include 
treatment × earnings surprise as a predictor variable, and are interested in β2, which indicates the 
marginal effect of treatment and earnings surprise on the outcome variable. Standard errors are 
clustered by day. 
yit = α + β1 treatmentit + β2 postit + β3 treatmentit × postit + β controlsit + eit (2) 
We also perform a difference-in-differences regression, specified by Equation 2. Again, yit 
is an outcome variable of interest: total page views, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and 
abnormal bid-ask spread for firm i on day t. There are two observations per firm, one for the day 
prior to the earnings announcement (t = -1) where post is a dummy variable equal to 0, and one 
for the day of the earnings announcement (t = 0), where post equals 1. The coefficient of interest 
is β3, which corresponds to the difference-in-differences effect of treatment on the outcome 
variable for the control group compared to the treatment group, from day t = -1 to day t = 0. 
                                                 
6 All main inferences hold when all control variables are included in the return regressions. 
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3. RESULTS 
Figure 3, Panels A to D graphically illustrate the effects of the Yahoo Finance promotion 
on four key measures: total page views, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-
ask spread from the fifth day prior to the earnings announcement (t = -5) to the fifth day after the 
earnings announcement (t = 5). In Panels E and F, we also illustrate how the effect of promotion 
on abnormal returns and abnormal bid-ask spread varies according to the level of earnings 
surprise. In Panel A, we find that the Yahoo Finance total page views are similar between the 
treatment and control groups, with only day t = -3’s difference being significant (p < 0.10). In 
Panel B, we compare abnormal volume for the treatment and control groups and find that 
differences in abnormal volume are statistically insignificant, except for days t = 2 and t = 3, when 
the control group abnormal volume is slightly greater (p < 0.10) than that of the treatment group.  
Panel C illustrates the abnormal daily returns. The largest daily difference in abnormal 
returns is on day t = 0, where treatment firms have abnormal returns 1.6 percent greater than 
control firms. This spread results from positive returns of 0.9 percent for the treatment firms and 
negative returns of -0.7 percent for the control firms. Returns for treatment firms are lower on days 
t = -1 and t = 3, though these differences are smaller at -0.6 percent and -0.5 percent, respectively. 
Panel D illustrates the mean abnormal bid-ask spread is fairly similar between the treatment and 
control groups, though treatment firms have a negative abnormal bid-ask spread on day t = 0, 
whereas control firms have a positive abnormal bid-ask spread on day t = 0.  
Panel E illustrates the mean abnormal returns for treatment and control firms, by quintile 
of earnings surprise. We find that the returns for treatment firms are greater than for control firms 
across the range of earnings surprise, but the effect is strongest for the lowest three quintiles of 
earnings surprise. Panel F illustrates the mean abnormal bid-ask spread for treatment and control 
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firms, by quintile of earnings surprise. We find that the reduction in abnormal bid-ask spread is 
greatest for firms in the lowest two quintiles of earnings surprise. Together, these findings indicate 
that stocks subject to promotion have higher returns on the promotion day, especially for firms 
with more negative earnings surprises—suggesting that retail investors thought it was a good 
opportunity to buy the promoted firms after the earnings news caused stock price declines. This 
finding is consistent with Lee (1992) who documents buying activity in small trades for both 
positive and negative earnings news. 
Table 2 reports the univariate differences between the treatment and control groups on the 
earnings announcement day. There are no significant differences for log total page views or 
abnormal volume (p > 0.10). This finding may be somewhat surprising given that the increased 
media promotion does not result in an increase in log total page views, which we might expect if 
users search for further financial information on promoted stocks after reading related news 
articles. Due to architecture constraints, Yahoo Finance news articles do not contain links to 
mentioned companies or ticker symbols. This chosen structure means that users who click on news 
articles cannot easily click through to related Yahoo Finance company pages, and instead must 
search for the company by name or ticker to view additional information. This limitation also 
means that our traffic statistics cannot associate news article views with a particular firm, and as a 
result we do not directly observe news article clicks. Figure 2, which illustrates an article that 
would have been seen by a user, shows that there are no active hyperlinks within the article to the 
stock of interest. Without such links, it requires effort on the part of users to access Yahoo 
Finance’s firm-specific information pages to acquire additional information, as they must enter the 
firm’s name or ticker symbol in the search function to access the detailed information pages. The 
lack of a ticker symbol linking reflects several factors: the difficulty in highlighting appropriate 
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ticker symbols from news text, that articles originate from many different sources, the fact that 
articles may relate to multiple ticker symbols, and that Yahoo likely has a revenue-related interest 
in encouraging users to continue reading down the page, leading to more news article views as 
opposed to engaging in further analysis of individual stocks. Combined, these factors may 
contribute to our finding that there is no evidence of additional information acquisition by sample 
users regarding treatment firms.  
We also find no abnormal volume differences between treatment and control firms (p > 
0.10). While past empirical studies of attention and volume (e.g., Antweiler and Frank 2004; 
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy 2008) find that the frequency and tone of message board 
activity and news articles relate to increased trading volumes, and that media strikes are associated 
with a reduction in trading volume (Peress 2014), in our setting, we are not varying the content or 
amount of news, instead we are simply increasing the salience of such content to a sample of 
users.7  
While we do not find a detectible effect on volume or Yahoo Finance page views, we do 
find that treatment firms have higher abnormal returns on the earnings announcement day 
compared to control firms. Mean abnormal returns on the day of the promotion are 0.009 for 
treatment firms, compared to -0.007 for control firms (the difference is significant at the p < 0.05 
level), indicating that treatment firms have higher returns when their news articles are selected for 
promotion. The negative returns for control firms is consistent with negative earnings 
announcement returns (untabulated) for the median Compustat firm reporting earnings from May 
12 to July 28, 2016. We also find a lower mean abnormal bid-ask spread for treatment firms, at -
0.001, versus control firms, at 0.001, a difference of 0.002, though the statistical significance is 
                                                 
7 The volume inferences are robust to calculating abnormal volume following Lerman and Livnat (2010). 
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near marginal for the entire sample (p = 0.11), providing some initial indications that there may be 
a reduction in information asymmetry for firms subject to media promotion.8  
To test whether the return findings are a spurious artifact of the treatment firms having 
larger earnings announcement returns, we conduct a placebo test whereby we examine the earnings 
announcement returns for treatment and control firms for the four earnings announcements 
preceding our treatment. In untabulated results, we find that the mean and median abnormal 
returns of treatment firms are not significantly different at conventional levels from those of 
control firms over any of the prior four earnings announcements. This analysis provides 
reassurance that the difference in returns during the treatment window is due to the treatment and 
not to an unobserved property of the randomly selected treatment firms. 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for all main variables for the pooled 
treatment and control firms. At the p < 0.05 level, abnormal volume is significantly correlated 
with abnormal bid-ask spread (corr. = 0.18), and guidance issuance (corr. = 0.26), while abnormal 
returns are significantly correlated earnings surprise (corr. = 0.31) and treatment, a dummy 
variable for firms with promoted news (corr. = 0.11). Abnormal bid-ask spread is significantly 
negatively correlated with earnings surprise (corr. = -0.11). Yahoo Finance log total page views 
is significantly correlated with abnormal volume (corr. = 0.17), log market capitalization (corr. = 
0.63), log media count, the number of media articles published on the earnings announcement day 
(corr. = 0.41), return on assets (corr. = 0.14), market to book (corr. = 0.21), and guidance issuance 
(corr. = 0.15). 
                                                 
8 We also tried to examine the percentage of firms in each user’s Yahoo Finance portfolio but these data are only available in real-
time and hence, there is no historical summary of the user’s portfolio holdings. 
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In Table 4, we perform a pooled regression of treatment and control firms on the earnings 
announcement day (t = 0), including a dummy variable, treatment, for firms with promoted news 
on day t = 0. Considering log total page views in Column (1), we find no significant relationship 
to treatment, however we do find that page views are significantly associated with log market 
capitalization (coeff. = 0.452, p < 0.01) and log media count (coeff. = 0.259, p < 0.05), which is 
consistent with the prior literature, but also clarifies that using media articles as a measure of 
attention may be confounded with the fact that more media articles are associated with underlying 
phenomena relating to the firm, increasing both information acquisition by investors as well as the 
amount of media coverage. Abnormal volume is the dependent variable in Column (2), and it is 
most strongly related to guidance issuance (coeff. = 1.083, p < 0.01).  
Turning to abnormal returns in Column (3), we find that treatment is associated with 
higher abnormal returns on day t, (coeff. = 0.015, p < 0.05), or a 1.5 percentage point abnormal 
return on day t. This treatment effect on abnormal returns confirms the inferences obtained in 
Figure 4, which shows a shift in the distribution of abnormal returns to the right for treatment firms 
compared to control firms. The most important determinant of abnormal returns on day t is 
earnings surprise (coeff. = 2.352, p < 0.01). We also test whether the effect on the dependent 
variable of interest is affected by the level of earnings surprise by including treatment × earnings 
surprise as a predictor variable. The coefficient on treatment × earnings surprise is -1.477 (p < 
0.10), providing some evidence that investor attention increases abnormal returns to a greater 
extent for firms with negative earnings surprises, consistent with the results illustrated in Figure 3, 
Panel E. This result is also consistent with findings in Barber and Odean (2008), who find that 
individuals are net buyers subsequent to bad news.  
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Column (4) provides results where abnormal bid-ask spread is the dependent variable, and 
the coefficient on treatment is -0.001 (p > 0.10), indicating that abnormal bid-ask spread may 
decline for treatment firms, but not at conventional significance levels. The coefficient on 
treatment × earnings surprise is 0.173 (p > 0.10), positive but not significant at conventional 
levels. Following Da et al. (2011), we investigate the possibility that the abnormal positive returns 
on the day of the promotion reverse in subsequent days. In untabulated analyses, we only find 
evidence of positive abnormal returns for the treatment firms on the earnings announcement day, 
and there are no positive or negative abnormal returns on any other day in the ten days following 
the earnings announcement. Thus, we do not find any evidence of return reversals for treatment 
firms in this ten day period. 
Given the lack of a significant observed effect of treatment on log total page views and 
abnormal volume, a discussion on the statistical power of our sample size is warranted (e.g., Barber 
and Lyon 1996). The sample size for the experiment in this study was restricted by Yahoo’s 
internal prioritization of resources and was not under the control of the authors. In a typical 
experimental setting, the researcher can estimate the required sample size of an experiment, using 
as inputs the population mean and standard distribution of the dependent variable, required test 
power, required statistical significance, and the researcher’s expected impact of treatment on the 
dependent variable. In our setting, ex ante, it was not possible to reliably estimate the impact of 
treatment on our variables of interest, because such an experiment has never before been 
conducted. We therefore conduct an ex post power analysis using the population distribution of 
the dependent variables and the Yahoo-determined sample size as inputs to estimate the required 
effect of treatment that would expected to be observable for our variables of interest. We set a 
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required significance of α = 0.05 (p-value), and a power of 1-β = 0.2 for this analysis.9 We find in 
untabulated results that the treatment effect required for observability is an effect of (1) 0.398 on 
log total page views, corresponding to an increase of 36.9 percent over the population mean; (2) 
0.655 on |abnormal volume|, an increase of 34.2 percent over the population mean; (3) 0.015 on 
|abnormal returns|, a 33 percent increase over the population mean; and (4) 0.0017 on |abnormal 
bid-ask spread|, or 143.1 percent of the population mean. The fact that we find significant results 
for abnormal returns and abnormal bid-ask spread is intuitively reasonable if the promotion 
treatment is associated with these users becoming marginal price setters, who can have a relatively 
large impact on prices and price-related variables, such as bid-ask spread. On the other hand, page 
views and abnormal volume and log total page views are aggregate measures, where the impact of 
marginal traders is much smaller. Consequently, our experiment has a lower power to detect an 
effect of promotion on volumes and page views, compared to returns and bid-ask spread. 
To isolate the effect of news article promotion, Table 5 presents a difference-in-differences 
research design, which compares the difference in Yahoo Finance page views and market 
responses from the day before the promotion (t = -1, post = 0) with the earnings announcement 
and promotion day (t = 0, post = 1). Columns (1) and (2) report on the effect of treatment on 
abnormal volume and log total page views, respectively, and the effect is not statistically 
significant, similar to the inferences drawn from the earlier analyses. Column (3) reports the 
difference-in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal returns. Consistent with the earlier 
analyses, treatment has a positive effect on returns in the post period (treatment × post coeff. = 
0.021, p < 0.01), compared to the control firms. As for the control variables, earnings surprise is 
positive as expected (coeff. = 1.086, p < 0.01). Column (4) provides results for the difference-in-
                                                 
9 We use absolute values for abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread because the mean value of these 
variables is expected to be zero. 
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differences effect on abnormal bid-ask spread, finding some evidence that treatment has a negative 
effect on bid-ask spread (treatment × post coeff. = -0.002) but this effect is not significant at 
traditional levels (p = 0.14).  
Together, these results indicate some interesting ramifications for investor attention, in a 
setting where investor attention is varied and other factors are held constant. We do not see an 
increase in information acquisition by the investors subject to the promotion of randomly selected 
earnings announcement articles, indicating either: (1) we lack the power to detect the effect in this 
relatively small sample; (2) investors are making purchase decisions based upon minimal 
additional research; or (3) they may be conducting research on another platform which we cannot 
observe, such as their broker’s web site. We also do not observe increases in trading volume, 
indicating that the increased attention among a sample of users appears to displace trading by other 
market participants. We do, however, observe higher returns to stocks that receive the additional 
investor attention, and that the higher returns are more pronounced for firms with negative earnings 
surprises. We also find weak evidence suggesting that the level of information asymmetry 
decreases for promoted firms, with a near significant reduction in bid-ask spreads for promoted 
firms. These results differ somewhat from the existing investor attention literature, where these 
outcome variables are often used as proxies for investor attention, and with the media literature, 
where media can also be influenced by such factors as trading volume, market returns, and 
information demand by investors. 
In Table 6, we investigate the effect of media promotion for less visible firms, predicting 
that the additional media promotion will have a greater effect on less visible firms. Panel A reports 
regression results similar to Table 5, but for firms with below-median market capitalization, and 
Panel B reports for above-median market capitalization. Inferences in Panel A are similar to the 
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prior results, though they are somewhat stronger for less-visible firms. There are no significant 
results for log total page views or abnormal volume in Columns (1) and (2). In Column (3) the 
difference-in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal returns is more pronounced for less-
visible firms (treatment × post coeff. = 0.026, p < 0.05). In Column (4), the difference-in-
differences effect of treatment on abnormal bid-ask spread is also more pronounced for less-
visible firms but insignificant at conventional levels (treatment × post coeff. = -0.003, p > 0.10). 
These results contrast with Panel B, which illustrates that for more visible firms, there is no 
difference-in-differences effects for any of the outcome variables. In Column (3), the difference-
in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal returns is positive but is not significant at 
conventional levels (treatment × post coeff. = 0.017, p > 0.10). 
In Table 7, we investigate the effect of media promotion separately for firms with positive 
and negative earnings surprises, as Table 4 and Figure 3 provide some insights that the market 
response to earnings announcements may be different for positive and negative earnings surprises. 
Panel A reports regression results similar to Table 5, but for firms with positive earnings surprises, 
and Panel B reports for negative earnings surprises. Inferences in Panel A are similar to the prior 
results, though they are somewhat weaker for positive earnings announcement firms. There are no 
significant results for log total page views, abnormal volume, or abnormal bid-ask spread in 
Columns (1), (2), and (4). In Column (3) the difference-in-differences effect of treatment on 
abnormal returns is less pronounced for positive earnings surprise firms and does not reach 
significance at conventional levels (treatment × post coeff. = 0.014, p = 0.12). These results 
contrast with Panel B, which illustrates that for negative earnings surprise firms, there is a 
significantly larger effect of treatment × post on abnormal returns (coeff. = 0.033, p < 0.05) 
compared to Panel A and the overall results from Table 5. Column (4) reports a slightly significant 
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negative coefficient for the difference-in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal bid-ask 
spread (treatment × post coeff. = -0.006, p < 0.10). These results indicate that while the effect of 
attention is similar in direction for both positive and negative earnings news firms, the effect is 
stronger for firms with negative earnings surprises.  
In our final table, Table 8, we examine the promotion effects on days when fewer than five 
stocks were promoted, predicting that the effects of promotion will be more pronounced when 
concentrated on a few firms. Panel A, presents the analyses in Table 5 but only on days when 
fewer than five firms were promoted. Consistent with earlier findings, the coefficients on log total 
page views or abnormal volume in Columns (1) and (2) are insignificant. However, in Column (3) 
the difference-in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal returns is more pronounced on days 
with less than five promoted firms (treatment × post coeff. = 0.032, p < 0.05). In Column (4), the 
difference-in-differences effect of treatment on abnormal bid-ask spread is also more pronounced 
and weakly significant (treatment × post coeff. = -0.003, p < 0.10). These results sharply contrast 
with Panel B, where the analyses in Table 5 are run only on days when five firms were promoted 
and all of the outcome variables are insignificant at conventional levels. We caveat these findings 
as days with less than five promoted firms also have less than 10 firms with schedule earnings 
announcements; however, days with five promoted firms could have hundreds of firms reporting 
earnings on those days. Hence, the effects could be driven by the concentrated promotion or the 
more focused attention given that there are less earnings announcements to distract experiment 
users. Nonetheless, the findings in Table 8 highlight that the effects of promotion are far more 
pronounced when the attention is more concentrated. 
In untabulated analyses, we run the analyses separately for the first half and second half of 
our sample periods in order to examine whether investors may become desensitized to the news 
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promotions over time. While we do find that our results are more pronounced for the first half of 
the sample period, it is also difficult to attribute this difference to desensitization as there are many 
more firms reporting in the second half of the sample. Hence, the weaker results that we observe 
in the second half could be due to user desensitization or to the more limited attention given the 
greater number of reporting firms in the latter part of the sample period.  
4. CONCLUSION 
 This study uses a field experiment to examine the effects of promoting earnings 
announcement articles on the equity markets. On the day of earnings announcements, media 
articles for a random sample of firms are given prominent positioning on the front page of Yahoo 
Finance to a one percent sample of Yahoo Finance users. We confirm that promoted and control 
firms are balanced across earnings news and fundamental characteristics, and we find that 
promoted firms experience an increase in abnormal returns on the day of the earnings 
announcement relative to control firms. Perhaps surprisingly, we do not find evidence of 
significant increases in trading volume or information acquisition by users subject to the 
promotion.  
Our findings reinforce the powerful and important role of online media, and how it can 
significantly shape individual behavior (e.g., Wu 2016). Furthermore, the study provides evidence 
that the market pricing of earnings not only depends on the earnings news but also on the extent 
of investor attention, and that investor attention may be a key mechanism driving the earnings 
announcement premium. Overall, we hope that this research encourages future capital markets 
field experiments.   
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Abnormal Returns𝑖𝑡 Firm i's market-adjusted return on day t, where market-adjusted return is defined as the 
raw return minus the S&P 500 equal-weighted index return; 
Abnormal Volume𝑖𝑡 Firm i's trading volume on day t minus the average trading volume on the same day of 
the week over the prior 10 weeks, scaled by the average trading volume on the same day 
of the week over the prior 10 weeks; winsorized at the one-percent level; 
Abnormal Bid
− Ask Spread𝑖𝑡 
Firm i's bid-ask spread on day t minus the average bid-ask spread on the same day of the 
week over the prior 10 weeks, scaled by the average bid-ask spread on the same day of 
the week over the prior 10 weeks. Bid-ask spread is calculated as ask price minus bid 
price, scaled by the mid-point price of the spread;  
Guidance Issuance𝑖𝑡 "1" if management issues an EPS or sales guidance for firm i on day t, "0" otherwise; 
Log Analyst Following𝑖𝑡 The natural log of one plus the number of analyst following for firm i on day t; winsorized 
at the one-percent level; 
Log Media Count𝑖𝑡 The natural log of one plus the number of media count for firm i on day t; winsorized at 
the one-percent level; 
Market Capitalization𝑖𝑡 The natural log of market capitalization for firm i on day t; winsorized at the one-percent 
level; 
Log Total Page Views𝑖𝑡 The natural log of one plus the total number of normalized Yahoo Finance page views 
of experiment users for firm i on day t. Page views are normalized by the mean daily 
page view count for all treatment and control firms during our sample period. Total 
Yahoo Finance page views is the sum of page views from nine Yahoo Finance pages 
including Summary page, Conversations page, Statistics page, Profile page, Financials 
page, Options page, Holders  page, Historical Data page, and Analysts page;  
Market to Book𝑖𝑡 The ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity for firm i on day t, and 
winsorized at the one-percent level and trimmed at 0 for firms with negative book value 
of equity; 
Post𝑖𝑡 “1” if firm i announces its earnings announcement on day t = 0, “0” for the trading day 
before the earnings announcement day (t = -1); 
Return on Assets𝑖𝑡 The ratio of net income to total assets for firm i on day t; winsorized at the one-percent 
level; 
Earnings Surprise𝑖𝑡 Firm i's actual earnings per share minus the most recent consensus analysts’ earnings per 
share forecast, scaled by the price per share two days before the earnings announcement 
day, winsorized at the one-percent level. For firms without analyst forecasts, the 
consensus is replaced with four quarters’ prior earnings as the benchmark (Bradshaw, 
Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012); 
Sales Surprise𝑖𝑡 Firm i's sales on day t minus its consensus analysts’ sales forecast on day t = -1, scaled 
by its consensus analysts’ sales forecast on day t = -1, winsorized at the one-percent 
level. For firms without analyst sales forecasts, the consensus is replaced with four 
quarters’ prior sales; and, 
Treatment𝑖𝑡 
 
“1” if firm i is a treatment firm, “0” for a matched control firm. A control firm is selected 
for each treatment firm per day based on the closest market capitalization match. 
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FIGURE 1 
Example of a Yahoo Finance Home Page for a Promotion Sample User 
 
 
 
This figure illustrates an example of a Yahoo Finance (finance.yahoo.com) home page for a user in the promotion 
sample, from May 18, 2016. On this day, Hormel, Steris, and Booz Allen reported earnings and were randomly 
selected from promotion. The effect of their promotion was to present news articles related to their earnings 
announcements among the top five positions in a random one percent sample of users’ home page news stream.  
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FIGURE 2 
Example of a Yahoo Finance News Article Page 
 
 
 
This figure illustrates an example of a Yahoo Finance (finance.yahoo.com) news page. This is the article presented to 
a user who clicked on the topmost article in the news stream presented in Figure 2. While the article clearly identifies 
Hormel’s ticker symbol, there are no active hyperlinks in the article headline or the body text to allow the user to 
easily jump to the Yahoo Finance financial information pages for Hormel. 
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FIGURE 3 
Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Spread around the Earnings 
Announcement Day 
 
Panel A:  Mean Log Yahoo Finance Total Page 
Views 
Panel B: Mean Abnormal Volume 
  
 
Panel C: Mean Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel D: Mean Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 
  
 
Panel E: Mean Abnormal Returns   Panel F: Mean Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 
    by Earnings Surprise Quintile    by Earnings Surprise Quintile 
 
 
This figure plots mean Yahoo Finance search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread on 
and around the earnings announcement day. Panels A-D plot the log value of total Yahoo Finance search, abnormal 
volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread from five trading days before the earnings announcement day 
to five trading days after the earnings announcement day, respectively. Panels E-F plot the mean value of abnormal 
returns and abnormal bid-ask spread by earnings surprise quintile, respectively, with quintile 1 being the lowest 
quintile and quintile 5 being the highest quintile. 
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FIGURE 4 
Kernel Density Estimation of Abnormal Returns for Treatment and Control Firms 
 
 
This figure presents a kernel density plot of abnormal returns for treatment firms (solid line) and control firms (dashed 
line). The density plot illustrates that there is a shift in the distribution towards more positive returns for the treatment 
group. 
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TABLE 1 
Firm Characteristics between Treatment and Matched Control Firms 
 
 Panel A: Mean Comparisons Panel B: Median Comparisons 
 Treatment Control   Treatment Control   
 Mean Mean Diff. Sig. Median Median Diff. Sig. 
N 169 169   169 169   
Market Capitalization (in millions) 14,099 15,304 -1,206 0.747 1,946 2,224 -278 0.447 
Log Market Capitalization 21.376 21.535 -0.159 0.505 21.389 21.523 -0.133 0.447 
Analyst Following 11.763 12.657 -0.893 0.403 10.000 10.000 0.000 0.530 
Log Analyst Following 2.225 2.287 -0.061 0.522 2.398 2.398 0.000 0.530 
Media Count 7.118 7.231 -0.112 0.853 6.000 6.000 0.000 0.994 
Log Media Count 1.885 1.849 0.037 0.646 1.946 1.946 0.000 0.995 
Return on Assets 0.026 0.004 0.022 0.109 0.039 0.029 0.010 0.357 
Market to Book  3.437 3.863 -0.426 0.379 2.284 2.350 -0.065 0.585 
Earnings Surprise 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.691 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.572 
Sales Surprise -0.337 -0.684 0.346 0.678 0.134 0.052 0.082 0.559 
Guidance Issuance 0.467 0.485 -0.018 0.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.745 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics between treatment and matched control firms. Panel A presents the mean comparisons. Diff. 
refers to the mean difference between treatment and matched control firms. Sig. refers to the p-value obtained from two-sided tests of differences in means. Panel 
B presents the median comparisons. Diff. refers to the median difference between treatment and matched control firms. Sig. refers to the p-value obtained from the 
Mann-Whitney tests of differences in medians.  
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TABLE 2 
Univariate Analysis of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread between Treatment and Matched Control 
Firms 
 
 Panel A: Mean Comparisons Panel B: Median Comparisons 
 Treatment Control   Treatment Control   
 Mean Mean Diff. Sig. Median Median Diff. Sig. 
N 169 169   169 169   
Log Total Page Views 1.315 1.468 -0.153 0.308 0.917 0.945 -0.028 0.344 
Abnormal Volume 2.389 2.539 -0.150 0.589 1.781 1.676 0.105 0.910 
Abnormal Returns 0.009 -0.007 0.016 0.037 0.006 -0.011 0.017 0.037 
Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.140 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for Yahoo Finance search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread between treatment and 
matched control firms. Panel A presents the mean comparisons. Diff. refers to the mean difference between treatment and matched control firms. Sig. refers to the 
p-value obtained from two-sided tests of differences in means. Panel B presents the median comparisons. Diff. refers to the median difference between treatment 
and matched control firms. Sig. refers to the p-value obtained from the Mann-Whitney tests of differences in medians.  
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TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation 
 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Log Total Page Views -           
2 Abnormal Volume 0.17 -          
3 Abnormal Returns 0.00 -0.09 -         
4 Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread -0.02 0.18 -0.07 -        
5 Treatment -0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.09 -       
6 Earnings Surprise 0.06 -0.05 0.31 -0.11 0.02 -      
7 Log Market Capitalization 0.63 -0.10 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.08 -     
8 Log Media Count 0.41 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.49 -    
9 Return on Assets 0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.10 0.43 0.15 -   
10 Market to Book  0.21 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.27 -  
11 Guidance Issuance 0.15 0.26 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.18 - 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the regression variables in Table 4. The significant correlation coefficients at a 0.05 level are bolded. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
Regressions of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread for Treatment and Matched Control Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -9.024*** -11.84 4.054** 2.28 0.001 0.14 -0.002 -0.34 
Treatment -0.048 -0.48 -0.150 -0.66 0.015** 2.29 -0.001 -1.46 
Earnings Surprise -8.891** -2.14 -16.905 -1.03 2.352*** 5.58 -0.134 -1.16 
Treatment × Earnings Surprise 11.802 1.61 17.517 1.00 -1.477* -1.85 0.173 1.26 
Log Market Capitalization 0.452*** 11.13 -0.123 -1.39   0.000 0.47 
Log Media Count 0.259*** 2.70 0.038 0.18   -0.000 -0.88 
Return on Assets -2.519*** -5.30 0.657 0.56   -0.002 -0.31 
Market to Book  -0.001 -0.11 -0.021 -0.86   -0.000 -0.15 
Guidance Issuance -0.142 -1.17 1.083*** 3.68   -0.001 -0.81 
         
Date clustering Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 338  338  338  338  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.485  0.163  0.112  0.034  
 
This table presents regression results for Yahoo Finance Search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread for treatment and matched 
control firms. Column (1) presents the results for the log value of total Yahoo Finance Search. Column (2) presents the results for abnormal volume. Column (3) 
presents the results for abnormal returns. Column (4) presents the results for abnormal bid-ask spread. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by date. Industry Fixed Effects are based upon Fama French 
12 industry definitions. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 5 
Regressions of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread for Earnings Announcement Day Relative to the 
Day before between Treatment and Matched Control Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns 
Abnormal Bid-Ask 
Spread 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -8.133*** -14.70 1.951** 2.06 0.007 1.24 -0.008 -1.39 
Treatment -0.026 -0.28 0.075 0.79 -0.006** -2.38 0.000 0.84 
Post 0.190 1.36 1.350*** 5.88 -0.009* -1.74 0.002 1.42 
Treatment × Post -0.043 -0.30 -0.242 -0.90 0.021*** 2.96 -0.002 -1.50 
Earnings Surprise 0.833 0.33 -5.595 -0.79 1.086*** 4.06 -0.006 -0.16 
Log Market Capitalization 0.400*** 15.53 -0.086* -1.95   0.000 1.39 
Log Media Count 0.316*** 6.46 0.102 1.36   -0.000 -1.68 
Return on Assets -2.090*** -7.26 1.117* 1.68   -0.007 -1.35 
Market to Book  0.000 0.02 -0.008 -0.65   -0.000 -0.45 
Guidance Issuance -0.055 -0.46 1.098*** 4.31   -0.001 -0.98 
         
Date clustering Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 666  666  666  666  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.491  0.287  0.068  0.012  
 
This table presents regression results for Yahoo Finance Search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread for earnings announcement 
day relative to the day before between treatment and matched control firms. Column (1) presents the results for the log value of total Yahoo Finance Search. 
Column (2) presents the results for abnormal volume. Column (3) presents the results for abnormal returns. Column (4) presents the results for abnormal bid-ask 
spread. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Industry Fixed Effects are based upon Fama French 
12 industry definitions. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by date. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  
 
37 
 
TABLE 6 
Regressions of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread for Earnings Announcement Day Relative to the 
Day before between Treatment and Matched Control Firms Partitioned by Firm Size 
 
Panel A: Small Firms      
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -3.403*** -5.44 -1.239 -0.70 0.012 1.37 -0.029 -1.63 
Treatment 0.071 0.60 0.133 0.74 -0.009* -1.87 0.001 1.12 
Post 0.090 0.90 1.577*** 4.56 -0.017* -1.79 0.003 1.53 
Treatment × Post -0.046 -0.34 -0.360 -0.83 0.026** 1.96 -0.003 -1.49      
    
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 335 
 
335 
 
335  335  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.211 
 
0.280 
 
0.105  0.028  
 
Panel B: Large Firms      
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -15.157*** -12.88 5.035*** 2.71 -0.001 -0.29 0.000 0.97 
Treatment -0.045 -0.34 0.127 1.06 -0.001 -0.27 0.000 1.26 
Post 0.174 0.82 1.124*** 3.45 -0.001 -0.06 -0.000*** -3.05 
Treatment × Post 0.018 0.09 -0.159 -0.46 0.017 1.44 -0.000 -0.93 
         
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 331  331  331  331  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.532  0.317  0.011  0.057  
 
This table presents regression results for Yahoo Finance Search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread for earnings announcement day 
relative to the day before between treatment and matched control firms partitioned by firm size. Panel A and Panel B present the results for small and large firms, 
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respectively. Small (large) firms are defined as the observations with market capitalization lower (higher) than the sample median. Column (1) presents the results for 
the log value of total Yahoo Finance Search. Column (2) presents the results for abnormal volume. Column (3) presents the results for abnormal returns. Column (4) 
presents the results for abnormal bid-ask spread. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Industry Fixed 
Effects are based upon Fama French 12 industry definitions. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by date. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
Regressions of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread for Earnings Announcement Day Relative to the 
Day before between Treatment and Matched Control Firms Partitioned by Positive and Negative Earnings Surprises 
 
Panel A: Positive Earnings Surprise     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -10.111*** -15.37 2.013 1.61 0.003 0.61 -0.014* -1.83 
Treatment 0.052 0.41 0.106 1.13 -0.006** -2.03 -0.001 -1.11 
Post 0.098 0.53 1.023*** 3.99 0.012* 1.88 0.000 0.12 
Treatment × Post -0.043 -0.23 0.070 0.26 0.014 1.57 0.000 0.19          
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 444  444  444  444  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.545  0.317  0.070  0.035  
 
Panel B: Negative Earnings Surprise     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -6.852*** -7.40 2.293 0.97 0.015* 1.84 -0.004 -0.54 
Treatment -0.121 -0.78 -0.061 -0.23 -0.009 -1.39 0.004* 1.99 
Post 0.172 0.96 1.673*** 4.21 -0.046*** -5.84 0.004 1.41 
Treatment × Post 0.082 0.34 -0.468 -1.05 0.033** 2.59 -0.006* -1.95      
    
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 222 
 
222 
 
222  222  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.380 
 
0.256 
 
0.120  0.001  
 
This table presents regression results for Yahoo Finance Search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread for earnings announcement day 
relative to the day before between treatment and matched control firms partitioned by positive earnings surprises in Panel A and negative earnings surprises in Panel 
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B. Column (1) presents the results for the log value of total Yahoo Finance Search. Column (2) presents the results for abnormal volume. Column (3) presents the 
results for abnormal returns. Column (4) presents the results for abnormal bid-ask spread. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests. Industry Fixed Effects are based upon Fama French 12 industry definitions. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by date. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
Regressions of Yahoo Finance Search, Abnormal Volume, Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread for Earnings Announcement Day Relative to the 
Day before between Treatment and Matched Control Firms Partitioned by Five and Fewer Than Five Treatment Firms 
 
Panel A: Fewer Than Five Treatment Firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -8.355*** -10.32 0.814 0.59 0.009 1.01 -0.013 -1.61 
Treatment 0.223* 1.74 0.048 0.33 -0.005 -1.15 0.001 1.59 
Post 0.090 0.58 1.766*** 5.11 -0.017** -2.13 0.004 1.65 
Treatment × Post -0.052 -0.23 -0.388 -1.00 0.032** 2.62 -0.003* -1.98      
    
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 302 
 
302 
 
302  302  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.517 
 
0.299 
 
0.136  0.012  
 
Panel B: Five Treatment Firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. Log Total Page Views Abnormal Volume Abnormal Returns Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread  
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -8.459*** -12.50 1.868 1.16 0.005 0.86 -0.009 -0.86 
Treatment -0.236* -1.84 0.138 1.02 -0.007** -2.28 -0.001 -1.62 
Post 0.284 1.25 1.112*** 3.92 -0.003 -0.42 -0.000 -0.06 
Treatment × Post 0.022 0.12 -0.134 -0.36 0.013 1.48 0.000 0.08 
         
Controls Yes  Yes  Earnings Surprise Yes  
Date clustering Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 364  364  364  364  
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.532  0.282  0.008  0.032  
 
This table presents regression results for Yahoo Finance Search, abnormal volume, abnormal returns, and abnormal bid-ask spread for the earnings announcement 
day relative to the day before between treatment and matched control firms partitioned by five and fewer than five treatment firms. Panel A and Panel B present 
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the results for days with less than five treatment firms and five treatment firms, respectively. Column (1) presents the results for the log value of total Yahoo 
Finance Search. Column (2) presents the results for abnormal volume. Column (3) presents the results for abnormal returns. Column (4) presents the results for 
abnormal bid-ask spread. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Industry Fixed Effects are based 
upon Fama French 12 industry definitions. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by date. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
